Can the Judiciary Guard Democratic Transitions of Power? An Indian-Israeli Perspective

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In this response to Tarun Khaitan’s article on democratic backsliding in India, Rivka Weill offers a comparative analysis of how the judiciary in two parliamentary democracies—India and Israel—has handled threats to democratic transitions of power.

While Khaitan identifies structural abuses in India (e.g., budget misuse, manipulation of the Speaker’s role, and weakening no-confidence mechanisms), Weill notes that the Indian judiciary largely failed to intervene. In contrast, the Israeli Supreme Court has twice intervened to preserve democratic accountability: (1) it warned against re-enacting a temporary Basic Law enabling a two-year budget cycle that would weaken annual confidence checks on the government; and (2) in the Yuli Edelstein case, it ordered the Speaker of the Knesset to hold an election amid a political deadlock—fearing potential obstruction of power transfer.

However, Weill cautions that judicial interventions may backfire. In Edelstein, the Court acted to protect democracy, but the outcome ironically led to the formation of a unity government that preserved Netanyahu’s leadership. Ultimately, courts play only a limited role in ensuring democratic transitions, which depend on broader institutional and civic engagement.

Suggested Citation:

Can the Judiciary Guard Democratic Transitions of Power? An Indian-Israeli Perspective, Law and Other Things NALSAR Blog, Dec 21, 2020.