Challenging the Constitutional Status of a Prime Minister in Israel

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It is commonly assumed that Israel’s system of government is parliamentary. The prevailing narrative is that Israel experienced a brief and unfortunate experiment with a quasi-presidential hybrid system through the use of two separate ballots—one for the prime minister and one for the Knesset—between 1996 and 2003. This hybrid system fractured the major parties and did not result in greater governmental stability. On the contrary, in many respects, it strengthened the bargaining power and leverage of small and medium-sized parties, contrary to the objectives underlying its adoption. According to the conventional narrative, Israel then reverted to its old, well-established parliamentary system.

Contrary to this narrative, I argue that Israel does not operate under a pure parliamentary system; rather, it exhibits quasi-presidential characteristics. In this essay, I propose a modification to the normative status of the prime minister, so that the prime minister’s downfall or replacement does not automatically precipitate the collapse of the entire government. The objective of my proposal is to strengthen the parliamentary system by altering the power dynamics between the prime minister and the government, on the one hand, and between the government and the Knesset, on the other. I seek to reduce dependence on the prime minister and to empower political parties as ideological entities capable of formulating platforms and operating collectively.

The quasi-presidential nature of our system entails significant drawbacks. One of the primary advantages of a parliamentary system is the prevention of personality cults surrounding the head of the executive branch. Compared to presidential systems, parliamentary systems place a greater emphasis on parties in setting the public agenda, encourage inter-party cooperation, and reduce the risk of political crises. However, in Israel, we are witnessing a process of personalization of politics to the extent that parties are often structured around individuals rather than ideas. Many parties are founded upon the leadership of a single individual and do not even hold internal elections (primaries).

Israel held five Knesset elections within four years, from 2019 to 2023, with some of the difficulty in forming a government revolving around parties' refusals to join a government headed by a leader accused and eventually indicted for criminal offenses. Israel’s political system suffers from severe instability, which is largely a result of the personalization of politics—a phenomenon inconsistent with the principles of a parliamentary system. Some parties have even neglected to present platforms before elections, thereby failing in their role to serve as forums for principled discussion on public issues.

It is important to clarify: I am not seeking to weaken the prime minister’s authority while they serve in office. I firmly believe that governmental stability is critical to the state’s continuity and existence, allowing us to avoid frequent elections. However, I contend that the government’s dependence on the prime minister should be reduced when it comes to leadership transitions. Such a reduction in dependency will indirectly influence the balance of power within the government, and between the government and the Knesset, even while the prime minister remains in office.

The Existing Law: Leadership Changes Bring Down Governments

There is no dispute that the Israeli system is parliamentary in the sense that the government is dependent on the confidence of the Knesset, derives its authority from it, and the prime minister must be a member of the Knesset. Generally, in a quasi-presidential system, the assumption is that the head of the executive branch is elected separately from the parliament. However, this is an outdated perception, and I argue that a prime minister can enjoy quasi-presidential status even if not directly elected.

The problematic quasi-presidential characteristic in Israel is that any change of prime minister automatically leads to the collapse of the government, regardless of the grounds for replacing the prime minister. In a pure parliamentary system, neither the parliament nor the government derived from it should be dependent on an individual, even when it comes to the head of the executive branch. By contrast, Israel’s Basic Law: The Government stipulates that if the prime minister dies, is permanently unable to fulfill their duties, is convicted by a final judgment involving moral turpitude, or resigns, the entire government is considered to have resigned. The rationale is that if the identity of the prime minister changes, the Knesset’s confidence in the successor cannot be presumed and must be actively sought anew.

This approach has historical precedent. For example, Tzipi Livni was unable to succeed Ehud Olmert as prime minister in 2008, and Shimon Peres failed to succeed Yitzhak Rabin in 1977. The fact that governments have fallen due to the resignation or death of a prime minister has significantly shaped Israel’s history. For instance, David Ben-Gurion’s resignation in 1961 and Ehud Olmert’s resignation in 2008 led to elections. Rabin was assassinated while serving as prime minister, and his successor, Shimon Peres, advanced the elections for both the Knesset and the prime ministership.

The consequence of a government’s collapse is that it automatically becomes a caretaker government, and the Israeli system suffers from significant political instability. Although a caretaker government is theoretically vested with the same authority as a regular government, in practice, its discretion is constrained by judicial precedent. A caretaker government is expected to exercise restraint unless there is a compelling public need for action.

As a result of this precedent, caretaker governments have at times brought the state to a near standstill over extended periods. Such limitations are justified because a caretaker government suffers from a democratic deficit and a serious representational problem. It may be more inclined to act in the interests of its members rather than the broader public.

The Knesset’s Justifications for Tying the Government’s Fate to the Prime Minister

An examination of Knesset deliberations to understand the rationale behind tying the government’s fate to that of the prime minister reveals that these arrangements were already in place during the 1960s, when the Basic Law: The Government was first adopted. At that time, the prime minister lacked any authority to dismiss ministers. As a result, dismissing a minister required the dissolution of the entire government.

In such a constitutional framework, Knesset members reasoned that, by analogy, if there was a change in the identity of the prime minister, it was appropriate for this to trigger the government’s dissolution. During the 1980s, the prime minister was granted the authority to dismiss ministers without causing the government’s collapse. However, the Knesset did not revisit the question of whether a change in the identity of the prime minister should also cease to result in the fall of the government.

When the Knesset adopted the system of direct elections for the prime minister in 1992, it strengthened the government’s dependence on the prime minister. Now, not only would the government fall due to the death or resignation of the prime minister, but also in cases of permanent incapacity or final conviction of the prime minister for a criminal offense involving moral turpitude. Tying the government’s fate to that of its leader was undoubtedly logical under a system requiring the direct election of the prime minister.

With the repeal of the direct election system, the Knesset decided to preserve the government’s dependency on its leader. Many Knesset members justified these arrangements by arguing that they are characteristic of a classical parliamentary system. According to numerous members of the Knesset, even in Britain, which serves as the archetype of the parliamentary model, if the prime minister is replaced, the entire government falls. Many Knesset members also believed that in such a situation, elections should be held, although ultimately, the Basic Law: The Government only requires the formation of a new government rather than calling for elections.

Challenging the Status of the Prime Minister in Israel

In practice, since the era of direct elections for the prime minister, every time the identity of the prime minister has changed, the Knesset has failed to establish an alternative government that enjoys its confidence, resulting in elections. This differs from the parliamentary era that preceded direct elections, during which, even when governments fell, the Knesset succeeded in forming alternative governments without resorting to elections.

I contend that the dramatic difference stems from the era of direct elections, which fractured the major parties. As a result, a mechanism that did not endanger governmental stability during a time of strong ruling parties now imposes a heavy price in an era dominated by medium-sized and small parties.

In my view, the assumption that the parliamentary system necessitates tying the government’s fate to that of the prime minister is entirely mistaken. It stems from a misunderstanding of the British model. The British system allows parties to dismiss their leaders without bringing down the government, and even without requiring the new government composition to be approved by parliament or obtain its confidence.

One only needs to follow the saga of Boris Johnson’s successors, who have been replaced repeatedly without toppling the government or triggering elections. These replacements occur through internal dismissal procedures within the ruling party.

Proposed Reform

Currently, the Basic Law: The Government stipulates that if the prime minister dies, is permanently unable to fulfill their duties, or is convicted—namely, in all situations where the prime minister cannot serve voluntarily—“the government shall appoint another minister who is a member of the Knesset and a member of the prime minister’s faction to serve as prime minister.” The existing Basic Law establishes the prime minister’s successor only within the framework of a caretaker government.

My proposal is to amend the Basic Law to specify that in all cases where the prime minister vacates their position, the government will appoint a different prime minister who is a member of the Knesset and a member of the prime minister’s faction, but the government will remain a regular government (and not a caretaker government). I seek to disconnect the dependency between the government's existence and the identity of the prime minister.

Since I aim to maintain governmental stability despite leadership changes, I believe the Knesset’s authority to express no confidence in the government should be eased in such a situation. For a defined period (for example, two weeks) following a leadership change, a simple majority of 61 Knesset members will suffice to express no confidence in the government, even if the opposition does not propose an alternative government. In other words, a standard no-confidence vote will be sufficient, without the need for a constructive vote of no confidence, to bring down the government after a leadership change. The Knesset would be required to take active and organized steps to dissolve a government due to a leadership change. The rebuttable presumption would be that the Knesset’s confidence in the government is maintained since it was granted to the government as a whole, despite the change in prime minister.

One may challenge my approach by arguing that I am making it easier to appoint a prime minister compared to appointing a minister. While the appointment of a new minister requires Knesset approval, replacing the prime minister would not require such approval. However, if the Knesset does not approve a minister, the government survives. If the Knesset does not approve a prime minister, the government falls. I propose that leadership changes should not require the Knesset’s active approval; rather, if the Knesset does not trust the government in its new composition, it must vote to express no confidence. The underlying idea of my proposal is to establish a default favoring the continuation of the government rather than its dissolution. Default rules often have significant implications for the behavior of individuals in general, and political actors in particular.

Advantages of the Proposal

What are the benefits I seek to achieve with this proposal?

First, I hope this reform will help reduce the personality cults that currently revolve around party leaders. The new message of the Basic Law would be that party leaders can be replaced without bringing down governments in Israel.

Second, reducing governments’ dependence on prime ministers could enhance political stability and reduce the frequency of premature elections.

Third, political parties would be compelled to prepare for leadership transitions by establishing clear mechanisms within their internal regulations for selecting a new party leader. Parties would want to regulate this matter to prevent other parties from engaging in political bargaining with their Knesset members to influence the identity of the prime minister during a leadership change within an ongoing government.

Fourth, voters may change their voting patterns. Today, voters can strategically “split” their votes based on their understanding of which candidate their party supports for prime minister, even if that candidate leads a different party. They are also confident that leadership changes will result in new elections. Once it becomes clear that parties may replace leaders without dissolving the government, voters will understand that the identity of all Knesset members representing a particular party matters, and they may become more interested in influencing the composition of the party as a whole rather than merely its leader.

On the other hand, I am not proposing to mandate the establishment of a mechanism for the government to dismiss the prime minister under defined circumstances. Such a proposal would further weaken the prime minister within a multi-party parliamentary system. The prime minister should not be placed in a constant state of paranoia, fearing for their position. Practically speaking, there is little chance such a proposal would be adopted by the Knesset, given that most parties are currently controlled by a few individuals who would prevent the passage of any law that would weaken the prime minister’s position while in office.

For similar reasons, I am also not proposing to require parties to explicitly establish dismissal mechanisms for their leaders within their internal regulations. The current law does not require parties to operate democratically in their internal governance. Paradoxically, this fact creates more pluralism at the national level. Nevertheless, I anticipate that once parties are required to establish mechanisms for replacing their leader in situations beyond their control, some may also adopt dismissal procedures that would mandate the resignation of their leaders under justifiable circumstances.

Such parties would be incentivized not to dismiss a successful party leader whose actions would be judged by the electorate on election day. However, failing to remove a leader under circumstances that merit dismissal could also affect voters’ judgment. Once the law establishes that replacing a prime minister does not cause the government to fall, new dynamics will emerge in the Israeli democracy, both in terms of government formation and dissolution. At times, Knesset members may pressure a prime minister to resign—a situation that does not exist today, where the resignation of a prime minister results in the collapse of the government. I anticipate that the new law would strengthen the status of Knesset members and the Knesset as a whole. Finally, Israel would be a truly parliamentary democracy in its essence.

Suggested Citation:

Challenging the Constitutional Status of a Prime Minister in Israel, ICON-S-IL Blog, June 15, 2023 [Hebrew].