Inherent Limits on the Override Power after the Israeli Election

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This piece examines the proposal to adopt a general override clause in Israel’s Basic Laws, allowing the Knesset to enact legislation that explicitly violates constitutional rights without judicial invalidation. Proponents, including PM Netanyahu and Ultra-Orthodox parties, see it as a way to bypass judicial checks—on military service exemptions and possibly criminal prosecution.

The override mechanism has historical precedent in Israel, both before and after the 1992 constitutional revolution. However, concerns remain that institutionalizing a general override could erode the protection of constitutional rights and judicial independence.

Drawing from both Israeli and Canadian experiences, the article argues that override powers must remain limited and temporary. To preserve constitutional hierarchy, overrides must (1) be time-bound, (2) apply to specific legislation, and (3) not violate core principles such as equality or the Jewish and democratic character of the state. If used indefinitely or broadly, the override becomes a tool of constitutional amendment—requiring a higher legal threshold and process.

Ultimately, while the override has roots in Israeli constitutional practice, its expansion poses risks to the rule of law and foundational values, which courts may justifiably constrain.

Suggested Citation:

Inherent Limits on the Override Power after the Israeli Election, Int’l J. Const. L. Blog, Apr. 18, 2019.